Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Past writings about swarming and the future of conflict (plus a closing comment about the bombing in Boston)


To my knowledge, John Arquilla and I were the first to identify swarming as an emerging mode of information-age conflict, in the late 1990s. Yet, while our work is well known in some circles, it has spread slowly (even unclearly) into other circles. Several times a year I’m contacted by someone, usually in the military, who has just come across one of our past writings about swarming and wants to know more. Or else I learn about someone, usually a social activist or academic scholar, who says something about swarming in a blog post or an article, and I want to make sure that he or she knows about our past work.

Part of my response is to send a list of bibliographic references. And I usually have to go digging around to find and list them once again, often tailoring the list to whether the interest is mainly in military or social swarming. This has happened enough times now that I might as well put it all mostly in one spot — this blog post — so that I can easily mention just one URL in a short email or blog comment, rather than lots in a long one.

List of past writings


So, for the sake of easing future reference, here’s a list of our key writings. All the RAND writings are available as free .pdf downloads at RAND’s website, though Amazon may offer them as well.

Our fullest statement is Swarming and the Future of Conflict (2000), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/
We expanded, especially on non-military swarming, in our volume on Networks & Netwars: The Future of Crime, Terror, and Militancy (2001), esp. in the last chapter, available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/
The best short military-oriented article we did was “Swarming — The Next Face of Battle,” in Aviation Week & Space Technology (September 29, 2003), available at
http://www.rand.org/commentary/2003/09/29/AWST.html
Before that, our first writing to make barely passing reference to swarming, without yet realizing its potency as a concept, was The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico (1998), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR994
The first time we deliberately wrote a section about swarming, after coming up with the term/concept, was in “Preparing for information-age conflict: Part 2 doctrinal and strategic dimensions,” in the journal Information, Communication & Society (1998), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rics20/1/2
RAND colleague Sean Edwards did two parallel historical reports on military aspects when he was at RAND as a student. His first, for one of John’s and my projects, was Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future (2000), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1100/index.html/
Sean later published his RAND Ph.D. dissertation on Swarming and the Future of Warfare (2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/RGSD/RGSD189/
[UPDATE — September 26, 2013: As an analyst with the U.S. military, Sean has done several briefings about swarming. An early one (2003) is located here, in Section C, pp. 1-11, in a large conference proceedings that also contains other interesting takes on swarming:
http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/swarming/swarming-c4isr.pdf ]
Since our RAND work, John elaborated more in his book Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (2008), available at
http://www.amazon.com/Worst-Enemy-Reluctant-Transformation-American/dp/1566637503/
John also wrote, among other items, an op-ed on “The Coming Swarm” in the New York Times (February 15, 2009), and an article on “The New Rules of War” in Foreign Policy (March / April 2010), available respectively at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war
More recently, John’s posts for his column “Rational Security” at Foreign Policy deal with swarming occasionally, available via
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4656
[UPDATE: An especially notable column is on “Killer Swarms” (November 2012), available via
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/26/killer_swarms ]
[UPDATE: John has published a new article about network-building that also makes points about swarming, past and present. The article — “To build a network,” PRISM, vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 23-33 — can be downloaded here.]

[UPDATE: John’s short piece titled “Countering and Exploiting Swarms” (April 2015?) at a U.S. Navy website about innovation offers some additional new observations.]

Since retiring, I have occasionally briefly discussed swarming and provided pointers (mostly just to writings listed above) somewhere in posts at my blog and in scattered comments at other receptive blogs when I spot relevant posts, e.g.,
http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2009/04/zapatista-social-netwar-revisited-more.html
http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2010/03/incidentals-3rd-of-5-apropos-future-of.html
http://fearhonorinterest.wordpress.com/2011/08/21/swarming-tactics/
http://zenpundit.com/?p=4280
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/9613.html
http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2012/03/miscellany-cyber-war-isnt-same-as.html
http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2011/12/what-occupy-protests-mean-timn.html
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2012/02/battledrones.html
That’s what I have for a basic list of our writings. But, long as I’m doing this post, I might as well include a few more points.

Additional background about our concept of swarming


Our key definition of swarming — the excerpt most quoted and cited by others — continues to stand the test of time:
“Swarming is a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, co-ordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. This notion of “force and/or fire” may be literal in the case of military or police operations, but metaphorical in the case of NGO activists, who may, for example, be blocking city intersections or emitting volleys of emails and faxes. Swarming will work best — perhaps it will only work — if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units. Swarming occurs when the dispersed units of a network of small (and perhaps some large) forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The overall aim is sustainable pulsing — swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to re-combine for a new pulse.” (2000, p. 12)
Our concept arose entirely from wondering how networked actors would form up and fight in the information-age. In a view we have elaborated before, the history of military and, to a lesser extent, social conflict is largely a history of the progressive development of four basic forms of engagement: the melee, massing, maneuver, and swarming. Briefly, conflict has evolved from chaotic melees in which every man fought on his own, to the design of massed but often rigidly-shaped formations, and then to the adoption of maneuver. Swarming has appeared at times in this history, but its major advances as a doctrine will occur in the coming decades. What our past write-ups do not show, except in a passing footnote, is that this formulation derives from a view of social evolution — a theory I term TIMN — which holds that, across the ages, societies have come up with only four major forms of organization: tribes, hierarchical institutions, markets, and networks. Thus, early tribes are associated with melees, hierarchical institutions with the rise of massed formations, market-oriented societies with the turn to maneuver doctrines, and now the new age of networks with swarming.

Two rival views of swarming remain deficient in our view: One emerged around observations about “swarm intelligence” in nature (e.g., birds, bees, ants, fish, as in Eric Bonabeau's early writings). It’s interesting, but it is more about decentralized flocking without any central command and control, rather than coordinated swarming as we understand it. Another view has grown around the notion of “network-centric warfare” (not to be confused with our notion of netwar). This view has moved swarming in a high-tech command-and-control direction having mainly to do with UAVs/drones, leading to lots of corporate interest. Drones are important, but we'd rather see advances at the soldiers’ operational and tactical levels. In any case, these two other schools of thought about swarming keep evolving in our direction.

Most interested parties have viewed swarming as (and often only as) tactics. But I continue to think that something much more than tactics is emerging.

A few personal points and pointers


Because I’m retired and for other reasons, I refrain from commenting on military swarming. I leave that to John, since he remains actively concerned with it and its potentials. But I’m still interested in it. My main interest is in non-military swarming by civil- and uncivil-society actors — for example, as it arose at times in the context of Occupy! movements here in the United States, and in police responses to them.

This post is about John’s and my writings, but whoever is interested in swarming should also search around for others’ writings. By now, I see, my holdings on the topic have grown quite large and diverse. This is not the place to list them extensively, but I would point to two sites that have carried lots of posts about swarming, including our work: from a social activist perspective, the blog and other pages at The P2P Foundation (p2pfoundation.net); and from a policing perspective, the blog at Law Enforcement and Security Consulting (lesc.org). [UPDATE — January 7, 2015: And from a military perspective, keep an eye on the War on the Rocks blog (warontherocks.com).]

In addition, new books on swarming have started to appear. I’m particularly curious to see two forthcoming books: Richard Falkvinge’s Swarmwise — The Tactical Manual to Changing the World (in 2013), and Marcia Stepanek’s Swarms: The Rise of the Digital Anti-Establishment (in 2013). Judging from their preliminary blog posts, neither recognizes our work. But both will surely serve to expand attention to all variants of the swarming concept.
[UPDATE — February 16, 2014:  Falkvinge's book is available online here, and some review comments are here.]
[UPDATE — October 30, 2014: The new book by Molly Sauter, The Coming Swarm: DDOS Actions, Hacktivism, and Civil Disobedience on the Internet (2014) relates to swarming and looks expertly written. But from what I can see so far, the term appears only in the title. See discussion here.]
[UPDATE — January 7, 2015: While I’ve refrained from listing military resources in this post, a must-mention now is Paul Scharre’s Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm (2014), available for download at CNAS here.]

Closing comment: apropos Boston


The two-man bombing attack in Boston, by itself, was not a case of swarming. It might be considered such only if it can be viewed as a step in a vast slow-motion global strategy by militant jihadists. (See Arquilla’s remarks about al-Suri here.)

However, the quick response to the bombing embodied two kinds of swarming: One was the multi-agency police response — indeed, swarming has long been a standard response mode for police, particularly in their deployment patterns. The other is a new kind of cyber-swarming (others would call it smart-mobbing or crowd-sourcing, using “big data”) whereby photographic data was collected from myriad sources and then processed and distributed in ways the led to the identification of the perpetrators. All quite impressive and yet to be fully reported and assessed. I just hope that aspects of such a response do not end up meaning America is headed for a kind of future cyberocracy that will be far less democratic than I’d like to see, as occasionally discussed elsewhere at this blog.

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

Further points about “tribes” (T) — plus a new proposition about TIMN as a whole


A recent post by Clay Spinuzzi focused on Morton Fried’s classic anthropology text The Notion of Tribe (1975), in which Fried makes a case that tribes were not the earliest form of social organization. Rather, tribes arose only after states intruded into outlying areas for imperial, colonial, or other purposes. In some areas, this drove the local inhabitants to resist by coalescing into tribes for the first time; in other areas, the intruding state organized the locals into tribes, the better to rule over them. Prior to that, says Fried, the locals lived together in loose, open, often kin-centric social formations that did not really qualify as tribes.

Thus, according to Fried,
“Although we are accustomed to think about the most ancient forms of human society in terms of tribes, firmly defined and bounded units of this sort actually grew out of the manipulation of relatively unstructured populations by more complexly organized societies. The invention of the state, a tight, class-structured political and economic organization, began a process whereby vaguely defined and grossly overlapping populations were provided with the minimal organization required for their manipulation, even though they had little or no internal organization of their own other than that based on conceptions of kinship. The resultant form was that of the tribe. (Preface, unnumbered page; h/t Spinuzzi).”
Fried’s argument, which is still widely accepted among anthropologists and occasionally tossed at me and my TIMN efforts, does pose something of a challenge for TIMN. One implication is that “tribes” is not a sound concept — the term should be abandoned. A second implication is that where they do turn up, tribes (T) did not precede states (the exemplary I) — making hierarchical institutions seem to be the first major form of social organization.

Clay’s post reminded me of the enduring hold of Fried’s argument (even though Clay did not endorse it himself). I’ve tried to deal with it before, so I initially figured I’d let it slide by this time — after all, I have other posts I should be focusing on finishing. But then I saw a new way to reconcile my view and Fried’s, and even to adapt his view to suit TIMN in a way that looks far beyond just tribes (T) and might benefit TIMN as a whole.

The next section reviews my past efforts to deal with Fried’s argument. The second section looks beyond it, by fielding a proposition about TIMN’s dynamics that involves all four forms.

Contra Fried: Clarifying TIMN’s view of tribes


Places where I’ve tried to deal with definitional issues raised by Fried and others include the following two publications, especially the second one, and the subsequent four posts at this blog, especially the last one, listed in chronological order:
  • Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare (2005/2007)
  • In Search of How Societies Work: Tribes – The First and Forever Form (2007)
  • We face a turmoil of tribalisms, not a clash of civilizations (here)
  • TIMN table details: learning that tribes are about “club goods” — and rethinking “collective goods” (here)
  • Difficulties clarifying the differences between tribes and networks — a continuing challenge for TIMN (here)
  • Incidentals (1st of 5): apropos definitions of “tribes” (and TIMN) (here)
They do not amount to a solid rebuttal of Fried’s view, but they make my key points, notably where I once discussed definitional debates affecting each of the TIMN forms, as follows:
“Some definitional issues should be noted, because each of the terms that are used to characterize a form can lead to long discussions. Two or three of the terms are subject to controversies. Also, alternative terms exist that some readers may prefer.
“The term tribe is widely used, but it is not in favor among all anthropologists (see Carneiro, 2003, pp. 137–139). Some prefer ethnic group or clan — or, from a different organizational angle, hamlet or village (Johnson and Earle, 1987). There is even an argument that tribes rarely preceded states in ancient eras (Fried, 1967, 1975). In this view, primitive, weakly united ethnic groups organized first into agricultural villages, and, perhaps later, evolved into chiefdoms and states, without ever truly being tribes (Otterbein, 2004). Or else these ethnic groups and their villages hardened into boundary-sensitive tribes — they “tribalized”—only after predatory states intruded into their territories (Ferguson and Whitehead, 1992). But these critics still acknowledge that kinship remained a defining principle and that early societies were uncentralized and nonhierarchical, which is in keeping with standard definitions of what tribes were like. ... Terms such as kinships or kindreds, although rarely used, might be alternatives to tribes. Clans is too narrow. A band is too small to qualify as a full-scale society.” (2007, p. 22)
Since then, during the years I’ve engaged in blogging, I saw the notion of “tribes” repeatedly come up for discussion in debates about Afghanistan and Iraq, with some anthropologists (but not all) claiming that other terms were preferable. The alternatives I saw included community, communal group, solidarity group, patronage network, ethnicity, "qwam" (an Afghan word), or just plain locals. At the same time, the proponents of such terms tended to use narrow, even idealized definitions of tribe — perhaps the better to diminish the term and dispute that a U.S.-led “tribal strategy” might be worth fashioning. Yet all along they kept referring to what are easy to regard as tribal/clan kinds of patterns and dynamics: e.g., kinship bonds, codes of honor, ancient narratives, ties to the land, respect for elders, collective identities, informal modes of governance, fusion and fission, etc.

Thus, even as they rejected the term and recommended others, their analyses kept showing that classic tribal dynamics, even tribalism, were enfolded into their analyses. Besides, the alternative terms they suggested fit well, for the most part, under my notion of the tribal form. Fortunately, there continue to be notable scholars who use the term in ways that make sense for TIMN: e.g., Thomas Barfield — esp. his Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (2012) and The Dictionary of Anthropology (1998) — and Thomas Ruttig (esp. his 2010 monograph on How Tribal Are the Taleban). A new book by Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (2013), also appears to resonate well with my TIMN views. [UPDATE: Also looking relevant is a new book by Mark Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom (2013).]

That still leaves up in the air whether ancient pre-state peoples amounted to tribes. I gather that many archeologists have doubts, much along the lines of Fried and other anthropologists noted above. Yet, the write-ups that I’ve seen keep deducing ancient organizational patterns and dynamics that, in my view, were quite tribe-like, even though local peoples may have been only loosely organized around kinship patterns back then. Moreover, archeologists also find that tribe-like tendencies may well have hardened — people got tribalized — if/when wars occurred in those pre-state eras.

So I’m persisting with “tribes” as the initial form in the TIMN progression, even if someday I decide to further soften my qualified view of its definition. No other term seems as well suited to what I am trying to do.

Beyond Fried: toward a new proposition about TIMN’s system dynamics


Thus I continue to disagree with the view that “tribe” does not deserve to be a key concept in anthropology, and that states preceded tribes as a major form of organization. Yet, Fried and others are surely correct about a key point: that the intrusive presence of states can lead to a hardening of local people into boundary-sensitive tribes.

I have no reason to contest that point; there’s evidence for it all around the world and across history. Moreover, I now see that this point leads to a way to reconcile Fried’s view and mine — indeed, a way to adapt his view to suit TIMN, such that the two views reinforce rather than contradict each other.

TIMN rests on a set of system dynamics. Accordingly, what happens to a form when a later form arises will be repeated again, in a new cycle, as the next form arises. I observed this in my first paper about TIMN (1993), and I’ve blogged about it here, mainly in a post titled “Explaining social evolution: standard cause-and-effect vs. TIMN’s system dynamics” (2009). Here’s what that post observes:
“By “system dynamics” — I don’t know what else to call them (and I’m open to suggestions) — I refer to patterned interactions among the TIMN forms that apply no matter which TIMN form is rising or settling, expanding or receding, influencing or being influenced. They reflect the ratcheting, spiraling coevolution of the four forms, rather than the specific causes and effects of each one. What is interesting about these dynamics is that they repeat whenever a form arises, irrespective of which form or transition it is. That is how and why this compact framework generates complex patterns.”
According to one of the propositions about TIMN’s system dynamics, the progression from monoform (T-only) to quadriform (T+I+M+N) societies is such that, with the rise of each new/next form,
Combination restructures and strengthens the overall system: As a form gains sway, combinatorial dynamics take hold vis à vis the established forms and their realms. The new form’s realm begins to separate from the older realms. The new realm cuts into parts of the older, takes some actors and activities away from them, and narrows and places new limits on their scope. The new form and its realm also have feedback effects that modify the design of the older forms/realms; they go through generational changes, which include taking on some attributes of the new form and its realm, perhaps partly to adapt to its growing strength. Yet, if all goes well, the addition of a new form and its realm ultimately strengthens the older ones; they emerge stronger — their capabilities grow within their scope of activity, even though that scope is newly circumscribed. Thus each new combination proves stronger than the old — e.g., a T+I+M society is generally stronger and more versatile than a T+I society.” (source)
That proposition was/is about new TIMN combinations arising progressively within a particular society as it develops — not really the kind of encounter between states and tribes that Fried wrote about. But the proposition does include noticing that the rise of a later form has effects that “narrow” / “limit” / “circumscribe” the scope of an older form, in ways that end up making it stronger within that scope. What I read into Fried’s view is that the intrusive presence of actors representing a newer form — in his case, the state — leads to a hardening, a tightening up, a heightened concern about boundaries, among adherents of an older form — in his case, tribes. And I’m sensing that this reading can be generalized across all the TIMN forms.

From a TIMN perspective, the rise of hierarchical institutions (+I) — and particularly their exemplary entity, the state — began thousands of years ago. And for thousands of years those statist entities were mostly empires, kingdoms, principalities, and other such entities that butted into each other in some cases, faced vague frontiers in other cases, and almost always lacked well-defined boundaries and jurisdictions. These entities were also governed through personal rule, not professional institutions.

States did not become well-defined entities with definite boundaries and citizenries until they began evolving into sovereign nation-states — eventually constitutional republics, notably in Europe. That began to occur particularly during the 17th century, after countless wars and other conflicts. What confirmed and consolidated this evolution of sovereign nation-states was the “Peace of Westphalia” — a set of peace treaties signed in Europe during 1648 that has turned out to symbolize the establishment of the nation-state system.

What seems relevant here from a TIMN perspective is that this 17th-century evolution of newly sovereign states occurs during the early centuries of the rise of the market form (+M) and its major expression, capitalism. This means that we see a curious reiteration of what Fried was talking about, albeit in a different era and with different TIMN forms at stake: Just as the rise of intrusive states (+I) induced some loosely-organized people to harden into boundary-sensitive tribes (T), so centuries later did the rise of intrusive market practices (+M) induce other people to harden into boundary-tightened nation-states (a later type of +I).

I know little about the history of this period, and can’t be sure right now that my intuition has a lot of validity. In order to be sure, I’d have to do new reading about economic factors that may explain political change in those centuries. That may well prove worth doing — suggestions, anyone? — but for now all I’m trying to do is field a possibly interesting proposition, not verify it in detail.

In this light, let’s take another look at the above quotation from Fried, while editing it so that wherever he mentions “tribe” we substitute “state” or “nation-state”, and for “state” we use “market” or “capitalism”:
“Although we are accustomed to think about the most ancient forms of human society in terms of tribes STATES, firmly defined and bounded units of this sort actually grew out of the manipulation of relatively unstructured populations by more complexly organized societies. The invention of the state MARKET CAPITALISM, a tight, class-structured political and economic organization, began a process whereby vaguely defined and grossly overlapping populations were provided with the minimal organization required for their manipulation, even though they had little or no internal organization of their own other than that based on conceptions of kinship [NATIONALISM]. The resultant form was that of the tribe NATION-STATE.”
It almost reads sensibly, and with a bit more editing, it might read pretty well — particularly if one is a Marxist (which Fried was) and regards capitalism as the great shaper of nation-states. In any case, I hope my little play on words helps make my case.

If this extension of TIMN is valid, then a new round lies ahead: the rise of networks (+N) will induce a hardening of people into boundary-sensitive markets. Markets (+M) are next in this extrapolation of Fried’s challenging proposition — new limits and boundaries will be placed around them. I don't have an exact, nor even a good, sense of what this may mean or how it may come about (a reversal for globalization? a new emphasis on regionalism? a separation of government and market? perhaps a few decades from now?). But it looks like a potentially interesting TIMN proposition — one worth keeping in mind and further exploring and refining as we go along.


Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Anticipating Sunday’s Daytona 500: a social-science laboratory for thinking about complexity theory, network analysis, and game theory


On the eve of the Daytona 500, I always feel like reprising an old paper, and this year, instead of hesitating for one reason or another, I’m doing so. That paper — “Social Science at 190 MPH on NASCAR's Biggest Superspeedways” (2000) — may initially seem alien to this blog’s themes about TIMN and STA, but it does bear on them tangentially. As the second half of the paper shows, what makes Daytona-type racing unique — shifting draft lines — can serve as a primer for understanding social science about complexity theory, network analysis, and game theory. No other sports event is so richly instructive about strategy and tactics for the information age, if only metaphorically.

As the abstract states,
“In aerodynamically intense stock-car races like the Daytona 500, the drivers form into multi-car draft lines to gain extra speed. A driver who does not enter a draft line (slipstream) will lose. Once in a line, a driver must attract a drafting partner in order to break out and try to get further ahead. Thus the effort to win leads to ever-shifting patterns of cooperation and competition among rivals. This provides a curious laboratory for several social science theories: (1) complexity theory, since the racers self-organize into structures that oscillate between order and chaos; (2) social network analysis, since draft lines are line networks whose organization depends on a driver's social capital as well as his human capital; and (3) game theory, since racers face a "prisoner's dilemma" in seeking drafting partners who will not defect and leave them stranded. Perhaps draft lines and related "bump and run" tactics amount to a little-recognized dynamic of everyday life, including in structures evolving on the Internet.”
Much has changed since I wrote the paper, but not so much that it is obsolete or irrelevant. The racecars’ designs — thus their aerodynamics and drafting qualities — are somewhat different. Yet the conduct of a race still depends on the drafting strategies / tactics my paper lays out. Television coverage is not as skillful as it used to be; compared to Fox, ESPN used to provide better reportage about “deals” being made during a race, and better overhead camera angles for watching draft lines form and decay. But many basics are still evident despite what has struck me as a dumbing-down of coverage. Also, my enthusiasm for this kind of racing peaked years ago, as it became more formulaic — often too boringly safe or dishearteningly crash-ridden. Even so, I’m looking forward to this Sunday’s race (February 24), intrigued by a slight redesign of the racecars, by Danica Patrick driving so fast to become the first woman to win pole position, and by the fact that my favorite team (Stewart-Haas Racing: Tony Stewart, Ryan Newman, and Danica Patrick) looks really strong.

If I were to redo the paper today, here are some revisions I’d make in the theory-oriented sections: I’d incorporate writings I missed at the time — notably, by James Golden on “cooperative competition” as an advisable diplomatic strategy (1993), and Adam Brandenburger & Barry Nalebuff on “co-opetition” as a game-theoretic strategy for businesses (1996). They spoke to one of my paper’s themes: that, in the information age, out-competing will increasingly depend on out-cooperating. And of course, I’d also incorporate subsequent writings — e.g., by Stephen Goldsmith & William Eggers on “competitor-partner networks” as a factor in “government by network” (2004), by Laurel Smith-Doerr & Walter Powell on how “groups of collaborators become involved in multiple forms of cooperation and competition” in high-tech business fields (2003/2005), by Jeffrey Cooper wondering how best to deal with complex network-like situations where cooperation, competition, and conflict are interactively intertwined (2009), and by Ben Hecht editorializing that “collaboration is the new competition” (2013). [UPDATE — March 11, 2015: In addition, Alexander J Stewart’s “New take on game theory offers clues on why we cooperate” (2015) summarizes insightful research about multi-player games where heavy cooperation by some teammates may incentivize others to defect — on grounds that “once strategies, costs and benefits start to co-evolve, something counter-intuitive can happen: cooperation starts to collapse.”]

I might do a better job of discussing “self-organization” in the section on complexity theory. Actually, I’d probably knock the concept, for much that is said to be self-organized — including Daytona draft lines — is often other-organized in some critical way. It’s frequently said (lately here; originally here?) that “The archetype of a self-organized critical system is a sand pile.” But I continue to doubt this, for sand piles are organized mainly by gravity — an outside force. And something similar applies to many groups that are said to be self-organized or self-organizing. They may well be so, to a degree; yet their postures and actions may also be shaped critically by the gravity of their situation, the physical context in which they are embedded, etc. — again outside factors that mean other-organization. It sounds good to be self-organizing, but it may also mislead analysis. And why sand piles are deemed an archetype or prototype remains a puzzle to me. Draft lines at Daytona are self-organizing too; but they are also other-organized by the high-banked nature of the track and many other factors, including the weather that day.

I’d surely add “strategic multiplexity” to the section on network theory. I’ve already blogged about this concept twice (here and here) and have little further to say about it. But it would make sense to introduce Daytona-type racing as an illustration. New material would also have to be added about network theory and the importance of social capital.

Finally, beyond these scholarly and theoretic updates, I’d try to say a lot more in a revised final section about implications for business, diplomacy, and other real-life endeavors. The parts about business — some would call it Business 2.0, or Capitalism 3.0 — might be easiest to elaborate, in part because over the years quite a few business-oriented writers have noticed and commented on the paper: e.g., Charles Duhigg, Carl Franklin, David Ignatius, Robert Lipsyte, Peter Orsi, Lisa Yoon. Drawing on points they and others have made, I’d point out that understanding Daytona-type racing helps show the importance of organizing business partnerships and commercial clusters. It helps show that strategy is the art of positioning: where go-it-alone can’t be a winning strategy, where connectivity can be decisive, where much depends on mutual trust and respect, where being second may be more advantageous than being the first to move out front, where defection by junior members to a rival team must be anticipated, as must episodic free-riding by the less-skilled.

Furthermore, understanding Daytona-type racing helps show that in business and other worlds being well-positioned is about much more than who’s leading and who’s following at any time. A lot depends on ancillary communications factors, such as the skill of “spotters” high in the stands who try to provide “topsight” for a team, or even on an ability to eavesdrop on rival teams’ communications. A lot also depends on technical adaptation during the course of a race. NASCAR races involve more varied and more constant adjustments to a racecar during a race than is the case with other motorsports. Trade-offs are made about whether to set up a car for short runs or long runs, for low or high grooves, for speed down a straight or grip around a corner, and for following or leading in a draft line. Tiny adjustments to tire pressures and tire cambers may have large effects on a car’s balance and maneuverability. Such points about topsight and adaptation are quite pertinent to business (and other) worlds, adding to why Daytona-type drafting is such an apt instructive metaphor.

I’d want (and have) to provide more real-life examples of such matters than the paper does in its dated condition. A good new example might be the rise of apps as a competitive factor. Some years ago Microsoft seemed to have drafting advantages over Apple, because Microsoft had more strategic partnerships with other major corporate players. But today Apple has the advantage, for it has thousands more small apps producers lined up with it. I could play that point out, but I’m sure you get the idea.

Many of these kinds of points also apply to the worlds of state diplomacy, party politics, and civil-society activism in the information age. But to wrap this post and get it out in a timely manner, I’ll just signal one point. The Obama administration’s foreign policy and national security strategy is often characterized (and criticized) as “leading from behind” — notable examples being the U.S. approaches to conflicts in Libya and Syria. That strikes me as being positively in line with the lessons a strategist may draw from Daytona-type drafting.

Finally, of course, I’d dress the paper up with more savvy quotes about Daytona-type racing. Here are two I have handy: Tony Stewart stating (in 2000) that “It’s not about what you and your car can do, it’s about what everybody else is doing to you and your car.” And David Ignatius noting (in 2000), that Daytona racing illustrates “partnering as a way of life” but also that “in the push for the finish line, the winner must have the killer instinct.”

Ah me, if I had a better killer instinct, I’d be finishing up languishing drafts for posts about TIMN rather engaging in this quickie diversion about a sporting activity that offers a better metaphor than any other sport for illuminating strategy and tactics attuned to the information age. But it’s been kinda fun. . . .


POSTSCRIPT — March 1, 2013: From what I saw and heard on Fox the day of the race, and later on the Speed channel, what happened on the last lap of the race was analytically interesting. Much of the race was tedious, exhibiting lots of monotonous single-file drafting. That was still the case during the last lap, until the cars entered the final high-banked turn.

Johnson led, followed by Biffle, Patrick, Earnhardt Jr., Martin, Keselowski, and Newman, in that order, all in line along the outside groove, with a car length or two between each car. Then Earnhardt began to “lay back” to get close to Martin, who also appeared to be easing back to Keselowski, who already had Newman near his bumper. This laying-back was probably accomplished by slowly pressing the brake pedal while keeping the gas pedal mashed. Earnhardt said later that he hoped Martin knew what was up, but odds are that there had been radio communications between the two teams, though the two drivers could not communicate directly.

As Earnhardt dropped back, his car and the three behind formed a closed-up draft line that gained a few extra miles-per-hour relative to the three spaced-out cars in front — the kind of tactical line that can be maintained for only a matter of seconds for a short distance before the cars space apart again. Fox swung the camera away to a sudden car crash back in the pack momentarily, interrupting my sense of what was happening up front. But when the camera swung back, it was evident that the Earnhardt-led line, coming off the high-banked turn, was dropping to the inside groove and “freight-training” under Patrick in third, and then Biffle in second, heading toward Johnson up front. Biffle and Patrick did not stand a chance of countering. As they got displaced and lost speed, Johnson moved in front of the oncoming Earnhardt-led line, and managed to hold position as they all swept across the finish line. It may have meant something that Johnson and Earnhardt drive for the same team.

Patrick remarked later that she was disappointed to fall back to finish eighth, largely because she had no drafting partner at the end. Biffle in front made no effort to make a go with her. And she could not count on Earnhardt behind if she had laid back to align with him, or tried dropping in front of his freight-train maneuver. Newman, who is one of her teammates, was not in a position to work with her at the end, and stayed in the line behind Earnhardt.

A mostly forgettable race, but a memorable finish in line with this post's analytic themes.

[UPDATE — April 19, 2013: First Monday, where I published the original paper, has been redoing the urls for older papers.  I hope the link correction I made up top holds for a while.  If not, search for the paper at First Monday's www site.]

Monday, December 3, 2012

Speculation: Is there an “assurance commons”? Do societies depend on it? Should there be a U.S. Chamber of Commons?


[UPDATES: See the updates at the end. Notice in particular the updates added March 29 and April 2, 2013, apropos support for my proposal for creating a networked series of chambers of commons, including a U.S. Chamber of Commons. Also see Addendums added on August 12, 2013; October 13, 2013; and during May 2015.]


People living together in a society come to require all sorts of assurances. Maybe it all began in early tribal societies that imposed assurances about family unity, neighborly respect, mutual sharing, and territorial security. But begin it does. And as societies become more complex, the need for assurances grows and grows — for evermore varied kinds of assurances, all evermore embedded in laws, codes, regulations, and standards. These assurances may even become defining aspects of a society’s heritage and culture — it’s national fabric. And eventually, lately in particular, the advanced societies come to depend on having an “assurance commons” — that’s what I propose to call it. And I’d say that, once noticed, this assurance commons can be seen to have great significance, and it’s going to increase in the future. Furthermore, maybe it’s time to propose creating a U.S. Chamber of Commons, somewhat modeled after the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but for quite different purposes.

* * * * *

The concept of “the commons” is on the rise these days, making quite a comeback from ages gone by, and promising to transform the advanced societies anew in the decades ahead. It’s proponents are eager to see the commons grow as a major sector alongside the established state and market (i.e., public and private) sectors. But, as I’ve noted in prior posts, it is still far from clear what the concept means — just exactly what it is, what belongs in it, and how and why to develop it.

The term “the commons” has long referred to resources (things? stuff? matters?) held and used “in common” — resources that all share and exploit together, to which anyone involved may have access, and for which all are (or should be) responsible stewards. Standard ways of categorizing commons typically start with natural or physical commons, such as the airs we breathe and waters we drink out in the open. To these may be added fields, forests, fisheries, and routes that are openly accessible and have not come under private control — as was often the case long ago.

Today, as a result of the digital information revolution, proponents of the concept see a vast immaterial commons taking shape as well. They point to the Internet and World Wide Web, and talk of a knowledge commons, a software commons, etc. Indeed, it is the emergence of this immaterial commons — plus the desire to keep expanding, exploiting, and managing it in shared ways, and to defend it from being enclosed or commodified by private or public powers — that has given brand new impetus to the concept of the commons, more than anything else occurring in regard to the material commons.

Beyond those basic points, a lot else may be added, depending on who is doing the theorizing. For proponents on the Left — the ones who are doing most of the theorizing — the concept is about new modes of “value creation” and “social production”, all for the sake of creating a commons-oriented economy, a commons-oriented state, and ultimately a commons-based society. And while much of this is about resources, their use and governance, it’s also about “commoning” as a new kind of activity, a way of doing and living that deserves to attract converts who want to practice “commonism” and thereby transform society.

In addition, the categories of resources and practices that could or should be part of the new commons becomes ever larger, to include not only the material and immaterial parts noted above, but also other, more specific areas and activities: e.g., health, education, welfare, banking, communications, industrial fabrication, tool libraries, etc. Distinctions are even made between possible capitalist and non-capitalist commons. And of course, Occupy Wall Street’s takeover of Zucotti Park led to claims that this public park — not to mention other parks and public spaces — under private management really belong to/in the people’s commons. Quite an ambitious agenda.

* * * * *

Here is a string of quotations, drawn from what I have at hand, that substantiate these points.  They’re from writings by some major proponents on the Left associated with P2P thinking.  I wish I could find quotations from other parts of the political spectrum as well, but they are lacking so far.

Jay Walljasper:
“1. The commons simply means ... all that we share and how we share it.
“It describes valuable assets that belong to all of us. This includes clean air and fresh water; national parks and city streets; the Internet and scientific knowledge; ethnic cuisines and hip-hop rhythms; the U.S. Weather Service and blood banks. But it’s more than just things — it’s also the set of relationship that make those things work. When you stop to think about, many essential elements of our lives exist outside the realm of private property. 
“2. The commons is not just history, it’s central to our lives today.
“The commons touches our lives throughout the day from tap water we use to brush our teeth in the morning to the fairy tales we tell our kids at night. While the phrase comes from the medieval era, describing lands that were open to commoners for grazing and foraging, the bigger idea of the commons — all that we share — never went away; we just forgot about it.” (source)

Jay Walljasper:
“The commons is more than just a nice idea; it encompasses a wide set of practical measures that offer fresh hope for a saner, safer, more enjoyable future. At the heart of the commons are four simple principles, which have been practiced by humans for millenia: 1) serving the common good; 2) ensuring equitable use of what belongs to us all; 3) promoting sustainable stewardship so that coming generations are not cheated and imperiled; 4) creating practical ways for people to participate in decisions shaping their future. …
“Private enterprise can flourish alongside a healthy commons sector. Indeed, a market economy would be impossible without commons institutions such as the legal system, corporate charters and financial regulations. And while government-run institutions such as schools, parks and emergency services are certainly part of the commons. So are Civic groups, non-profit organizations, community organizations, informal meeting places—indeed, any gathering of people for the common good is a crucial elements of the commons.” (source)

Silke Helfrich et al. (?)
“Commons are diverse. They are the fundamental building blocks and pre-condition of our life and social wealth. They include knowledge and water, seeds and software, cultural works and the atmosphere. Commons are not just “things,” however. They are living, dynamic systems of life. They form the social fabric of a free society. 
“Commons do not belong to anyone individually nor do they belong to no one. Different communities, from the family to global society, always create, maintain, cultivate, and redefine commons. When this does not happen, commons dwindle away – and in the process, our personal and social security diminishes. Commons ensure that people can live and evolve. The diversity of the commons helps secure our future.” (source)


Silke Helfrich et al. (?)
“Commons are not just common goods or assets. They are not “things” separate from us. They are not simply water, the forest, or ideas. They are social practices of commoning, of acting together, based on principles of sharing, stewarding, and producing in common. To ensure this, all those who participate in a common have the right to an equal voice in making decisions on the provisions and rules governing its management. 
“Examples of the rich variety of such experiences and innovations include systems for community management of forests, canals, fisheries and land; the numerous processes of commoning in the digital world such as initiatives for free culture or free and open software; non-commercial initiatives for access to housing in cities; strategies for cooperative consumption associated with social currencies; and many others. All of these commons are clearly forms of management that differ from market-based ones and from those organized by hierarchical structures. Together they offer a kaleidoscope rich in self-organization and self-determination. All are neglected and marginalized in conventional political and economic analyses. All are based on the idea that no one can have a satisfactory life if not integrated into social relations, and that one’s full personal unfolding depends on the unfolding of others and vice versa. The borders between the particular interest and the collective interest are blurred in a commons.” (source)


Jean Lieven
“There are a number of important features that can be used to describe true commons. The first is that true commons cannot be commodified – and if they are – they cease to be commons. The second aspect is that while they are neither public nor private they tend to be managed by local communities and cannot be exclusionary. That is, they cannot have borders built around them otherwise they become private property. The third aspect of the commons is that, unlike resources, they are not scarce but abundant. If managed properly, they work to overcome scarcity.” (source)


Michel Bauwens et al.
“A commons is a shared resource that is either inherited from nature (and Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Laureate in economics, has documented the rationale and governance of such natural resource commons), or created by human beings, either in the 'immaterial fields' of knowledge and culture (this includes for instance free and open source software and shared designs), or by holding productive human capital (machinery and the means of production) in common stock. The commons is not exclusively defined by non-ownership and access, but by some form of common governance. Ostrom’s contributions were to show that it was the governance of the commons which protected them from the ‘tragedy of the commons’ that can befall open access resources that lack that governance.” (source, p. 158)


David Bollier:
“The commons helps us see that we are actually richer than we thought we were. It’s just that our common wealth is not a private commodity or cash. It’s socially created wealth that’s embedded in distinct communities of interest who act as stewards of that wealth. Because the value is socially embedded, it can’t simply be bought and sold like a commodity. The commons can be generative in its own right – but the wealth it generates is usually shared, non-monetized value. 
“We can especially see the generativity of the commons on the Internet, which is a kind of hosting infrastructure for digital commons. ...  
“Think of the hundreds of millions of photos on Flickr or the millions of Wikipedia entries in over 160 languages. Think of the more than 6,000 open-access academic journals that are bypassing expensive commercial journal publishers. Think of the Open Educational Resources movement that is making open textbooks and the OpenCourseWare movement started by M.I.T. Think of the hundreds of millions of online texts, videos and musical works that use Creative Commons licenses to enable easy sharing. Think of the vast free and open source software community that is the basis for a rich and varied commercial software marketplace.
“There are countless such digital commons based on peer production and sharing. In fact, the bestiary of commons is now so large and varied that there is what amounts to a Commons Sector for knowledge, culture and creativity.” (source)


David Bollier:
“Let me just say upfront that the commons is neither a totalizing political ideology nor a PR re-branding of “the public interest.” It is a general template of governance that has deep roots in human history as a system of self-provisioning, responsible resource-management and mutual support. …
“Perhaps I should start by emphasizing that a commons is not a resource in itself. It’s a resource plus a social community and the social values, rules and norms that they used to manage the resource. They’re all an integrated package. …
“That may be why conventional economics has so much trouble understanding the commons. It doesn’t understand how the community, rather than the individual, can be the framing term of reference. The commons looks at the whole and regards the individual and the collective as nested within each other and interpenetrating each other. This is a very different metaphysics than that of the modern liberal state, which sees the individual as sovereign.
“The commons also asks us to transcend some of the familiar dichotomies of modern life – “public” vs. “private,” “individual” vs. “collective,” “objective” vs. “subjective” – and to begin to see these dualisms in a more integrated, blended form. “Cooperative individualism” is one shorthand that I like to use.” (source)


John Michael Greer:
"It’s not hard to name other examples of what I suppose we could call “commons-like phenomena” — that is, activities in which the pursuit of private profit can impose serious costs on society as a whole — in contemporary America. …
"That is to say, the core purpose of government in the American tradition is the maintenance of the national commons. It exists to manage the various commons and commons-like phenomena that are inseparable from life in a civilized society, and thus has the power to impose such limits on people (and corporate pseudopeople) as will prevent their pursuit of personal advantage from leading to a tragedy of the commons in one way or another. Restricting the capacity of banks to gamble with depositors’ money is one such limit; restricting the freedom of manufacturers to sell unsafe food is another, and so on down the list of reasonable regulations. Beyond those necessary limits, government has no call to intervene; how people choose to live their lives, exercise their liberties, and pursue happiness is up to them, so long as it doesn’t put the survival of any part of the national commons at risk." (source)


A. J. Fisher:
“Before I get into the fundamental requirements of a Sensor Commons project it’s worth defining what I mean by the term. For me the Sensor Commons is a future state whereby we have data available to us, in real time, from a multitude of sensors that are relatively similar in design and method of data acquisition and that data is freely available whether as a data set or by API to use in whatever fashion they like. …
“The access we are getting to cheap, reliable, malleable technologies such as Arduino and Xbee coupled with ubiquitous networks whether WiFi or Cellular is creating an opportunity for us to be able to understand our local environments better. Going are the days where we needed to petition councillors to do some water testing in our creeks and waterways or measure the quality of the air that we are breathing.
“The deployment of these community oriented technologies will create the Sensor Commons; providing us with data that becomes available and accessible to anyone with an interest. Policy creation and stewardship will pass back to the local communities – as it should be – who will have the data to back up their decisions and create strong actions as a result.” (source)


James Quilligan
“In considering the essential problem of how to produce and distribute material wealth, virtually all of the great economists in Western history have ignored the significance of the commons — the shared resources of nature and society that people inherit, create and utilize. ...  
“... Whether these commons are traditional (rivers, forests, indigenous cultures) or emerging (energy, intellectual property, internet), communities are successfully managing them through collaboration and collective action. This growing movement has also begun to create social charters and commons trusts — formal instruments which define the incentives, rights and responsibilities of stakeholders for the supervision and protection of common resources. Ironically, by organizing to protect their commons through decentralized decision-making, the democratic principles of freedom and equality are being realized more fully in these resource communities than through the enterprises and policies of the Market State.” (source)


Helene Finidori:
“The idea of growing or expanding the commons as meta-narrative and the type of ecosystem of change that could support it are worth looking into. ...  
“We should multiply opportunities to formulate this meta-narrative and examine how various micro-narratives could be expressed in relation to the commons, which mecanisms could empower engagement and how networks could enable it. This would generate discussions on the basic principles for the integrity of the commons and how they would be best 'grown', providing some feedback on the modalities and boundaries of 'growth', transforming in the process the definition of growth itself. It would give the commons a voice, and set a framework to prevent or limit further enclosure, cooptation and corruption of the commons and the commons vocabulary. It would provide a basis for viral communication.” (source)


Benni Bärmann
“In my opinion, the commons approach, which we have discussed here repeatedly, meets all these demands. Conservatives like that it is conserving and community-oriented, liberals like its distance to the state and that it is not completely incompatible with market economies, anarchists like its focus on self-organisation, and socialists and communists embrace that it promises to control property commonly. The applicability of commons theory reaches to nearly all kinds of contemporary movements and commons play a fundamental role in all crises of today. Finally, there exists a multitude of theories around the commons, so we do not have to start from scratch. 
“It is not essential that every single activist in every social movement can live with this platform. More important is achieve support for it through a critical mass of movements with as many different worldviews as possible. If this is accomplished, a new dynamic in the medium and long term unfolds due to productive relations between theory and practice. Commons-based movements also mix well with traditional multi-strategic movements.” (source)


Silvia Federici:
“Commons, if they are to function and flourish, must be conceived of as local formations of shared responsibility for collective resources. But clearly, there are commons upon which all localities, all life in fact, depends: the atmosphere, water, intellectual and creative innovations. And isolated commons require the support of a network of other local commons. Efforts to resist the enclosure of commons build upon the local, but necessarily depend upon the solidarity and support of commoners everywhere. The efforts to build global commons networks, such as The Commons Strategies Group, The Global Commons Trust, and the School of Commoning, are crucial and every effort should be made to support their growth and activities. We need to know what commoners are doing elsewhere in the world, as we come to understand and better work in and through our own commons.” (source)


David Bollier:
“[N]ow that collective action is so empowered by digital platforms, it’s time for government policymaking to start to take account of this development and make better use of it in its own governance.  They could start by recognizing the very idea of the commons as a useful, socially resilient and politically legitimate vehicle for achieving important work.  If government can charter financial mafias known as banks and corporations, ostensibly to advance the public interest, why not the commons?” (source)


Marvin Brown:
"In its broadest sense, the “commons” refers to things that cannot or should not be exclusively owned. The commons is the polar opposite of commodities. (source)
“In a commercial society, what counts as wealth is what can be treated as a commodity in the market. In a common society, wealth will not be limited to what we can purchase, but will include all that we need for a good life. People will acquire much that they need through sharing and giving. Instead of focusing on the accumulation of property, the focus will be on the making of provisions. …
"These differences are not absolute. It would be a mistake to see the distinction between commercial and common wealth as an either/or choice. We need commercial activities and property ownership. I am not trying to do away with either one, but rather trying to put them in their place in a commonwealth that actually provides wealth for everyone." (source)


Burns Weston & David Bollier:
"Commons Values Span the Political Spectrum
“Commoners are not all alike. They have many profound differences in their governance systems, management practices, cultural values, and so on. However, they tend to share fundamental commitments to participation, openness, inclusiveness, social equity, ecological respect, and human rights. Consumerism, limitless economic growth and maximum profitability are shunned. …
“As German commons advocate Silke Helfrich notes, “commons draw from the best of all political ideologies.” Conservatives like the tendency of commons to promote responsibility. Liberals are pleased with the focus on equality and basic social entitlement. Libertarians like the emphasis on individual initiative. And leftists like the idea of limiting the scope of the Market.” (source)


Nathan Schneider
“The commons is a powerful concept for connecting many struggles and issues. Shiva spoke of seeds as a commons, and Rifkin spoke of Net neutrality and the commons of the Internet. Jones spoke of the commoning taking place in the streets of Ferguson, Missouri, in the form of street memorials and protest encampments. In 2009 at the World Social Forum meeting in Brazil, delegates circulated a document that identified the commons as an umbrella for their many struggles over rights to such essentials as land and water. More recently, in the wake of Occupy Wall Street, veterans of the movement turned to the commons as a means of connecting the dots among their disparate grievances. In May I went to Ecuador for a policy summit that proposed the world’s first national transition plan toward a commons-based economy — imagining a society of businesses owned by their workers and customers, open seed libraries for farmers, and indigenous medicines that no drug company can patent. …
“It remains to be seen what the commons will come to mean — a catch-all buzzword easily co-opted by the establishment or a genuine shift away from it.” (source)

In addition, I’ve seen similar views expressed earlier by Sierra Club advocates:

Carl Pope:

“If intelligent commons management, not private property, creates genuine wise use and stewardship, then maybe we should reexamine our cultural prejudice against the commons. And we certainly ought to question the even deeper dedication to privatizing — and destroying — nature’s bounty." (source)


Jonathan Rowe:
“It is significant, then, that an old term is reappearing to describe what is being threatened. It is "the commons," the realm of life that is distinct from both the market and the state and is the shared heritage of us all. Vandana Shiva, an Indian physicist and environmental activist, writes about the commons of water and seeds. Lawrence Lessig, an author and lawyer, describes the innovation commons of the Internet and the public domain of knowledge. Others are talking about the atmospheric commons, the commons of public squares, and the commons of quiet. … 
“If advocates of the commons in its many forms were to embrace the concept as a defining theme, the result could be a new and potent political force.” (source)

Unfortunately, voices on the Right are usually dismissive.  They typically rely on extolling Garrett Hardin’s classic article “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) — not realizing and/or not reporting that he later said that he should have titled it “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons” (source, p. xvii).  Such voices on the Right also neglect favorable analyses, now epitomized by Elinor Ostrom’s book Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990).

What strikes me from a TIMN perspective is that, while there may well be tragedies of the commons, especially under unmanaged conditions, there can also be tragic failures for improperly managed tribes/families, institutions/states, and markets — i.e., for all the TIMN forms.  Indeed, many of the advanced world’s economies are suffering today from failures wrought by statist and capitalist misbehaviors.  The commons do not have a monopoly on the prospects for tragedies.  Surely there are voices on the Right and in the Center who are ready to reconsider the values of the commons!?

[UPDATE — Janua 9, 2013: Thanks to watching Ken Burn's documentary The Dust Bowl, I’ve learned that the tragedy known as the dust bowl is a good example of a kind of tragedy of the market. I had long thought the dust bowl was just a result of a regional climate change. Far from it: The dust bowl was as much man-made as nature-made. It resulted from years of rampant capitalism and “get-rich-quick” individualism to take advantage of frenzied market opportunities for selling real estate and cultivating wheat in ways that tore up the grasslands and ignored weather history, almost creating what one observer called a “man-made Sahara” in the middle of our nation. And it led to instructive debates about whether to abandon the region to fate, or come up with government-sponsored innovations to rescue and revitalize it.]

* * * * *

My speculation about there being an “assurance commons” is largely in line but partly at odds with the preceding. While my term doesn’t sound right to me, I’ve been unable to come up with a better one for what I think I’m after: a term, really a criterion, for clarifying what may and may not belong in the commons, particularly if societies evolve as TIMN forecasts. Plus, I have my own angles for coming up with this particular term and wanting to try it out:
First, as may be seen in several prior posts (e.g., here), I’ve started to wonder about the concept of the commons. In particular, whether it’s still mostly about resources, as in the past, or whether it’s increasingly about something else. And I’m inclined toward the latter, though specifying it remains a puzzlement.
Second, I’ve also wondered lately about “insurance” — its various types (e.g., auto, fire, health), the extent to which it may be a private, public, or mixed public-private good (or service), and whether in some instances it may be viewed as part of a commons. And if the latter, how and why?
Finally, I recalled the term “information assurance”. Indeed, I first heard “assurance” used in connection with “information assurance” — a field concerned with information security. In brief, information assurance (IA) is about “strategic risk management”: “the IA practitioner does not seek to eliminate all risks, were that possible, but to manage them in the most cost-effective way.” While I’ve never liked the term, it has endured, and now I mean to borrow from it. Indeed, its emphasis on strategic risk management seems useful for this post. (Also interesting, but less resonant, is “quality assurance”.)
By “assurance commons” I mean to tap into a notion that, as societies progress, becoming more complex, the prospects for the commons become less about resources and more about practices — specifically, about the deeper purposes and functions that citizens want assured in, for, and by their society. Accordingly, the commons consists of resources and practices, available to all involved, that become required by the public (civil society) and thus mandated by the state and accepted by business. These would be grand assurances — ones that provide for basic needs, by making people’s lives more safe and secure, thus enabling them to live and work together not only as individuals but also on society’s behalf. Many such assurances may correspond to what used to be called public interests and public goods.

Looking ahead, then, I’d try asking not so much what comprises the commons from a resource perspective. That’s old school. Let’s try asking instead what comprises the commons from an assurance perspective. That’d be new school, more in keeping with how much societies have advanced, and how far they’ve yet to go.

For me, thinking in terms of an assurance criterion leads to supposing that people at large in advanced societies seek to include the following: Assurances not only of fresh air and water, but also that food, medicine, and other products are made safe, free of dangers. Assurances that basic health, education, and welfare services are provided in equitable ways. Assurances that one’s vote counts. Assurances, in America, that the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and law more generally, not to mention many codes and regulations, are upheld and apply to all people (including corporations in their capacity as “persons”). Assurances of access to . . . well, I’m not sure how much to keep adding to this listing. Hopefully you get my point. I’m not trying to come up with a comprehensive list, just a preliminary indicative exploration.

As I wonder about what else might be listed, it seems even clearer that the commons is no longer so much about resources. It is indeed increasingly about practices — including policies — that assure rights and responsibilities, as well as accountability; practices that assure open and abundant access and usage; practices that assure universal services and public utilities, broadly defined; practices that require strategic risk management and quality assurance for the benefit of people at large; practices that make a society more robust and resilient, on everyone’s behalf.

* * * * *

There appears to be a preference among forward-looking proponents on the Left that the commons be managed by commoners who organize into peer networks and cluster into a commons sector, without much if any involvement by established public or private sector actors. Building the commons is viewed as a way to break with standard dialogue about states versus markets — moreover, as a way to work outside the system, partly on grounds that working inside would reinforce the “state/market duopoly”.

From a TIMN perspective, I see some but only limited prospects for that view.  Instead, I’d surmise that an assurance-commons approach in a complex society means that all sectors must be involved: state, market, civil society.  Taking an assurance-commons approach would surely help propel the rise of a new commons sector, but many matters permeate into all sectors.  They would have to be involved and re-oriented as well (as the best versions of P2P theory also maintain).

Thus, assurance commons may require a strong state, big or small.  But an assurance state would not be simply a welfare state, nor an entitlement state, nor a regulatory state.  It may be partly all those things, but it would also be more, and less, and different, depending.  My notion is to include welfare programs in the assurance commons — e.g., Social Security and Medicare (or their successors) — since people have required assurances in those regards.  But assurance commons are not just about welfare; they are much broader.  They may require the kind of state posed in past posts at this blog: TIMN’s nexus state, P2P’s partner state, and/or Red Toryism’s civic state.

Assurance commons may well require a strong market system.  It’s almost a precondition:  Business enterprises generate deleterious externalities — e.g., air and water pollution — that lead to public demands for environmental assurances (e.g., regulations).  At the same time, advanced economies require healthy educated workforces — another matter that generates demands for assurances.  Furthermore, assurance commons as a whole tend to be expensive; a thriving innovative market system — a positive type of capitalism — is needed in order to generate the incomes and taxes that can help pay for assurance commons.

Assurance commons also require a vital civil society.  After all, it’s the main source of demands for assurances, far more than state or market actors.  Furthermore, civil-society actors seem likely to play increasingly significant monitory roles in the future, to see that assurances are  maintained and jeopardizers held accountable.  Indeed, assurance commons would benefit from the spread of monitory democracy enabled by a sensor commons, topics I’ve discussed in prior posts.

Another point:  Assurance commons will surely have different characteristics at different levels of society.  A nation may define for itself a national society-wide commons to some extent.  Yet, there may also be somewhat different commons created at state and community levels (e.g., via building codes).

Of course, not every assurance that people seek would or should pertain to an assurance commons.  For example, just about everybody wants their home to be safe and secure from intruders; but that does not mean that home alarm systems comprise an assurance commons.  The concept entails a definitional-boundaries problem that would have to be clarified if it is to be developed.  My start here is insufficient for defining exactly when an assurance pertains to a commons, though I tried to suggest some criteria above.

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If the preceding makes sense, it may have all sorts of implications.  Here are some that I can think of for this exploratory post:
The commons are bigger, broader, more significant, and more complex than people generally realize. Yet, the commons also remain largely ignored. Their/its presence and importance get buried under today’s aging politicized preferences for rhetoric about public vs. private or government vs. market approaches. Ways should be found to use the term “commons” more often, and to elevate recognition of it/them. I’ll close this post with a proposal for doing so.
The characteristics of the commons are shifting: As noted above, the commons become more about practices than resources as societies progress. Moreover, commons are not as much about economics as many past analyses and current formulations on the Left (and elsewhere) imply. Lots of political, social, cultural, and other (cyber?) matters are involved. I should think it would benefit the revival of the concept of the commons if it were not so frequently analyzed in such intensely economic ways. Assurance is not automatically an economic concept; thus it might help broaden and refocus discourse a bit — at least that’s my speculative hope.
Much as I like the idea of a “commons sector” (from both TIMN and P2P viewpoints), an “assurance commons” would not correspond to a distinct sector. The concept presented in this post is broader. But its activities would help stimulate the formation of a distinct sector, perhaps especially if it were to impel monitoring by NGOs in ways that accord with monitory democracy.
An assurance-commons approach would not make governance issues any easier to deal with, but it might help illuminate them. As Elinor Ostrom’s work has shown, people are learning to manage common-pool resources in polyarchic network-like ways, without having to turn to old hierarchy- and market-like ways. But assurance commons involve more than common-pool resources. They also involve some of the knottiest governance issues around — e.g., in the field of health — requiring extensive coordination among multiple public, private, and other actors.* Regulatory challenges abound. Thinking in terms of an assurance commons might (or might not?) help spotlight governance issues in ways that direct attention to needs for developing new network modes of governance alongside and intertwined with existing public and private modes.
A classic ideal about the commons persists in the assurance-commons notion: It’s up to people at large — civil society, not just government or business — what belongs in the commons. Much depends on their values and needs.

*[UPDATE — January 9, 2013: Apropos my reference above to governance issues in the health area, I’ve run across three discussions about commons aspects that I’d like to add to this post. One, by George Por, is about “managing health and healthcare as a commons” (source, summary). The second is about a working group at the University of Indiana that focuses on new designs for “managing the health commons” (source). The third is about a Rockefeller study for “catalyzing markets for global eHealth” by fostering an “eHealth Commons” (.pdf). All three seek to apply Elinor Ostrom’s principles to healthcare governance.]

* * * * *

A bottom line for this post — perhaps its punch line — is to propose the creation of a U.S. Chamber of Commons, modeled somewhat after the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC).  Indeed, how about a whole series of chambers of commons, at local, state, and regional levels!?  They could form into a sprawling network whose purposes might include assessing and lobbying on commons issues, helping shape a commons sector, advancing the monitoring of commons matters, and congregating interested actors.

Thus, even though a U.S. Chamber of Commons might be modeled after the existing USCC, or after chambers of commerce more generally, the purposes would be very different, as would governance, sponsorship, membership, and audience.  I‘d imagine the two chambers would be rivals on many matters, but it may well be time for such a rivalry.  It might help reform and rebalance the American system at all levels.  In my TIMN view, this could aid America’s evolution from a stalled distorted triformist (T+I+M) system to an innovative quadriformist (T+I+M+N) system.

Who might be interested in seeing such a chamber created?  Lots of businesses and NGOs, I’d suppose, that are already known for having some commons-oriented views:  e.g., Wikimedia, Google, Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Skoll Foundation, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, National Council for Responsible Philanthropy (NCRP), Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Whole Foods, Ben & Jerry’s, Starbucks, Evergreen Cooperatives, Association for the Advancement of Retired People (AARP), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Cleveland Clinic — these are entities that come to my mind, with a little help from others*.

Yet these are just big names that come easily to mind.  Greater impetus might come from numerous non-profit activist organizations, community associations, church organizations, for-benefit businesses, and other commons-friendly enterprises that I am not yet familiar with (and that might object to the risks of a chamber being co-opted by the big names).  Once a chamber got founded, myriads would come forth — or so I imagine.  They may amount to a seemingly eclectic set of organizations — but that would be part of the strength and appeal of having a U.S. Chamber of Commons.

UPDATE: I first posted these ideas almost four months ago (December 3, 2012).  Now, I’m delighted to see that the idea of creating a series of chambers of commons has received the beginnings of significant support:

Michel Bauwens:

“I believe the time is there to start constructing the following three institutional coalitions:

“The civic/political institution: The Alliance of the Commons ...
“The economic institution: the P2P/Commons Globa-local « Phyle » ...
“The political-economy institution: The Chamber of the Commons ...

“In short, we need a alliance of the commons to project civil and political power and influence at every level of society; we need phyles to strengthen our economic autonomy from the profit-maximizing dominant system; and we need Chambre of the Commons to achieve territorial policy; legal and infrastructural conditions for the alternative, human and nature-friendly political economy to thrive. Neither alone is sufficient, but together they could be a powerful triad for the necessary phase transition.” (source;also here

David Bollier:

“They [policymakers] could start by recognizing the very idea of the commons as a useful, socially resilient and politically legitimate vehicle for achieving important work.” (source)

“ ... Ronfeldt has proposed an idea whose time may have arrived: let’s create a new federated network of commons enterprises called the “Chamber of Commons.” ...
“... It would be especially exciting if a chamber of commons could begin to span the cultural barriers that divide digital and natural resource commoners, not to mention international political boundaries. ...
“As this little thought-exercise suggests, clarifying the criteria for membership in a Chamber of Commons could be one of the biggest but most important challenges. ...
“... The best solution, I think, lies in having serious commoners, as members, decide the criteria on an ongoing basis, and pass judgment on any new members. After all, any participants in such a project would have a big stake in protecting the integrity of the commons concept and its reputation. ...
“... It’s time for various commons and commons-based businesses (coops, CSAs, etc.) to find ways to band together. We need to create a new focal point for making commoning more visible in an organized way. The mutual support, dialogue and new initiatives could only be enlivening.” (source)

My own view of the chamber idea is currently somewhat different. But no matter — these supportive elaborations compound my hope that going in this direction will gather substance and momentum.


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*Many thanks to brother Stephen Ronfeldt and blog friend Michel Bauwens for comments on the last section.  Besides, Steve’s Public Interest Law Project and Michel’s P2P Foundation would make excellent additions to a chamber of commons, Steve’s at the state level, Michel’s at the global level.

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[UPDATE — December 17, 2012: Ouch, I see I did a faulty job of searching for "chamber of commons" to find whether any already existed, and missed one that does. It's in fact called the Chamber of Commons, and is also known as the Rogue Valley Chapter, in Ashland, Oregon. The web site is chamberofcommons.com, and I gather from exploring it that the chamber was founded in February 2012 as a “newly formed 501 c 6 business & non- profit advocacy, marketing and stewardship endeavor.” A brochure is available here (.pdf). My concept may be grander, but the founders of this local chamber were on to the basic idea first. (A big h/t to Michel Bauwens for pointing the chamber out.)]

[UPDATE — February 7, 2013: I added a quote from John Michael Greer.]

[UPDATE — February 13, 2013: I added quotes from Carl Pope and Jonathan Rowe, plus a reference to the NCRP.]

[UPDATE — February 19, 2013: I added a quote from Helene Finidori.]

[UPDATE — February 27, 2013: I added a quote from David Bollier.]

[UPDATE — March 29, 2013: I added a quote from Silvia Federici, plus a major statement by Michel Bauwens advocating the creation of chambers of commons.]

[UPDATE — April 2, 2013: I added quotes from David Bollier, indicating considerable support for the idea of creating a networked series of chambers of commons.]

[UPDATE — August 13, 2013: I added another quote from David Bollier.]

[UPDATE — February 12, 2014: I added a quote from Marvin Brown.]

[UPDATE — August 20, 2014: I added a quote from Burns Weston & David Bollier.]

[UPDATE — January 28, 20015: Added quote by Nathan Schneider.]

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[ADDENDUM — August 12, 2013: Evidently it’s going to take a long time for ideas about citizens chambers of commons to gain traction. Meanwhile, here’s another view — from Gar Alperovitz and Steve Dubb, “The Possibility of a Pluralist Commonwealth and a Community-Sustaining Economy” — about building new organizations that, among other purposes, may help counter the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
“New organizations like the Business Alliance for Local Living Economies (BALLE) and the American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC) have also been quietly developing momentum in recent years. BALLE, which has more than 22,000 small business members, works to promote sustainable local community development. ASBC (which includes BALLE as a member) is an advocacy and lobbying effort that involves more than 150,000 business professionals and thirty separate business organizations committed to sustainability. Leading White House figures such as former Labor Secretary Hilda Solis have welcomed the organization as a counter to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Jeffrey Hollender, Chair of ASBC’s Business Leadership Council and former CEO of Seventh Generation, has denounced the Chamber for “fighting democracy and destroying America’s economic future” because of its opposition to climate change legislation and its support for the Citizens United decision.” (source / source)
I still prefer my idea — it would involve much more than sustainability or business — but BALLE and ASBC look viable and at least they’re underway.]

[ADDENDUM — October 13, 2013:  Michel Bauwens, in a new post about “Transition Proposals Towards a Commons-Oriented Economy and Society” (here), provides further momentum for the idea of a chamber of commons, by including in his vision the following points:
“Ethical market players create a territorial and sectoral network of Chamber of Commons associations to define their common needs and goals and interface with civil society, commoners and the partner state” …
“Local and sectoral commons create civil alliances of the commons to interface with the Chamber of the Commons and the Partner State” …
“Solidarity Coops form public-commons partnerships in alliance with the Partner State and the Ethical Economy sector represented by the Chamber of Commons”.
Meanwhile, thanks to David Bollier posting about “How to Build a “Shareable City”” (here), I see that a new report titled Policies For Shareable Cities: A Sharing Economy Policy Primer For Urban Leaders (2013) identifies civic initiatives for constructing “the sharing economy”:
 “[T]he sharing economy can democratize access to goods, services, and capital – in fact all the essentials that make for vibrant markets, commons, and neighborhoods. It’s an epoch shaping opportunity for sustainable urban development that can complement the legacy economy. Resource sharing, peer production, and the free market can empower people to self-provision locally much of what they need to thrive.” (p. 4)
“This is the sharing economy.  It is characterized by an explosion of practices such as carsharing, ridesharing, cooperatives, community farms, shared housing, shared workspaces, and a multitude of new micro-enterprises made possible by platforms that connect supply and demand at the peer-to-peer level.” (p.6)
Nowhere does the report mention the idea of creating citizens chambers of commons, but I’d speculate that such a chamber could prove invaluable for promoting appropriate initiatives.]

[ADDENDUM — May 11, 2015: Michel Bauwens advanced the proposal in his A new evaluation of the FLOK experience in Ecuador: what’s next? as published on April 7, 2015:
“The Commons transition plan is based on a simultaneous transition of civil society, the market and the state forms. …
“In the Commons Transition Plan, we are making also very specific organizational proposals, to advance the cause of a commons-oriented politics and a ‘peer production of politics and policy’.
“At the local level, we propose the creation of Assemblies of the Commons, institutions that bring together all those that are creating or maintaining commons, immaterial or material, but we propose to restrict membership to civic organizations and not-for-profit oriented projects.
“At the same time, we propose the creation of local Chamber of the Commons, the equivalent for the ethical economy and ‘generative’ capital, the what the Chamber of Commerce is for the for-profit economy. Our aim is to reconstruct commons-oriented social forces at the local level, and to give them voice. These assemblies and chambers could produce a social charter, that would be open for political and social forces to support, which in turn would guarantee some forms of support from these new institutions.” (source)]

[ADDENDUM — May 8 & 15, 2015: And here’s a new sign of momentum: announcement of a gathering of activists in May to consider Creating a Chamber of Commons: A Continuing Discussion (source), leading to the question Could Chicago be the first city to create a Chamber of Commons? (source), partly on grounds that Chicago Chamber of Commons Points Way to Thrivability for All (source).]