tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4245279442880338057.post5070633548947418058..comments2023-11-26T01:12:05.167-08:00Comments on Materials for Two Theories: TIMN and STA:C: Why Mexico may NOT fall apart — and a way to think about itDavid Ronfeldthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06488855410947866567noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4245279442880338057.post-22319480193974986672009-05-25T11:15:24.183-07:002009-05-25T11:15:24.183-07:00The Mexican government has never worked, so why ex...The Mexican government has never worked, so why expect that it ever will? Without the U.S. to prop it up, where would it be? Yet the sad situation at the U.S.-Mexico border problem forever looms.<br /><br />The age-old pesky U.S.-Mexico border problem has taxed the resources of both countries, led to long lists of injustices, and appears to be heading only for worse troubles in the future. Guess what? The border problem can never be solved. Why? Because the border IS the problem! It's time for a paradigm change. <br /><br />Never fear, a satisfying, comprehensive solution is within reach: Megamerge: the Dissolution Solution. Simply dissolve the border along with the failed Mexican government, and megamerge the two countries under U.S. law, with mass free 2-way migration eventually equalizing the development and opportunities permanently, with justice and without racism. <br /><br />http://tlwinslow.weebly.com/megamerge-the-dissolution-solution.htmlHistoryscoperhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13821885034444628101noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4245279442880338057.post-13942763171735755392009-04-19T14:16:00.000-07:002009-04-19T14:16:00.000-07:00Discussion of this post at Rethinking Security (se...Discussion of this post at Rethinking Security (see “Building Networked Force Structure in Mexico,” beginning April 7) led to the following remarks:<br /><br />Adam Elkus:<br /><br />I am in firm agreement with Ronfeldt that a key part of any US strategy towards Mexico will be the construction of cross-border networks for border security. The advantage of these ad-hoc groups is that they can collaborate in a manner that is fundamentally more immediate and bottom-up, providing a useful means of producing policy, sharing information, and coordinating response. The Border Governors' Conference (yearly on both sides of the border) is a great example of these kinds of forums--as is the more informal military and police cooperation that has been built up over the years.<br /><br />My comment:<br /><br />On our side, what we need are networks that work, more than czars. Czars and networks don’t quite fit together. Yet, I’ll be patient and hopeful for a while. After all, I’ve written elsewhere in favor of “government by network” under the rubric of cyberocray. Border relations may become a good proving ground.<br /><br />But I won’t focus on this here. I’d rather emphasize something else today:<br /><br />On Mexico’s side, recent developments are reminding me of two old cautionary patterns that sometimes affect bilateral relations. American newcomers to Mexico are not likely to know about them.<br /><br />One is about how Mexicans — I’m speaking of policy analysts and strategists — often criticize the United States for speaking with so many different voices, for being so disorganized, that Mexico cannot be sure what Washington wants. It’s a solid criticism. And back in the late 1970s, some of us listened and proposed the creation of a single, special office in Washington for managing complex interdependence with Mexico. But then, to my surprise, as soon as it looked like Washington was getting organized, the line among Mexicans reversed. The complaint became that we wanted to become centralized in order to further U.S. domination. Therefore, Mexico should not welcome or otherwise support this effort by Washington to speak with one voice. In short, the analysis was turned upside down, inside out. They longed for a return to our disorganization.<br /><br />Of course, many new bilateral mechanisms have taken hold since that early effort, so I don’t mean to harp on the pattern’s persistence — but I’ve seen indications of its remergence lately.<br /><br />The second pattern has to do with Mexican resistance to concrete American proposals to strengthen aspects of bilateral cooperation, even where doing so may be to Mexico’s advantage in some respects. An example I recall involved providing a new technology decades ago. What was explained to me once, almost as an aside, was that Americans always have a list in mind; and if Mexico accedes to something, the Americans will just start pressing for the next item. Relations then became an endless, exhausting struggle. Better not to even start, if it can be avoided.<br /><br />Again, I simplify, and I don’t want to exaggerate. Bilateral relations have progressed anyway. And I’ve seen no recent indications of this pattern’s reemergence. But it is an interesting pattern, still worth knowing about in my view.<br /><br />Both patterns are rooted in Mexico’s historic, indeed eternal concerns about preserving national sovereignty and dignity. They are sensible concerns that Americans will have to work with and through. And I hope we can.<br /><br />Meanwhile, I continue to see evidence that my original proposals — about the residual importance of camarilla networking inside Mexico, and about the need to organize stronger cross-border (or pan-border) networks for military, police, and intelligence cooperation — remain worthwhile.<br /><br />My second comment:<br /><br />At last, there’s a potentially upbeat article today -- the latest in the generally downbeat latimes series on “Mexico under Seige” -- that reports on a Mexican army general’s mounting success against criminal gangs in the Tijuana area. Among the points made:<br /><br />“The police departments in Tijuana and Rosarito Beach, as well as the state police, are now run by current or former army officers.<br /><br />“Gone are many of the police informants, or ‘antennas,’ that supplied organized crime with intelligence and cleared the streets before cartel kidnappings and raids, U.S. and Mexican authorities say.<br /><br />“‘They took away [organized crime's] eyes and ears,’ said one source . . .”<br /><br />Read more here: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-drugs-general18-2009apr18,0,4688678,print.story<br /><br />I’m supposing this helps substantiate points I’ve been trying to make, but I can’t be sure because, among other things, the article only hints at networked cooperation.David Ronfeldthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06488855410947866567noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4245279442880338057.post-1728161898415260002009-04-19T14:08:00.000-07:002009-04-19T14:08:00.000-07:00Discussion of this post at ZenPundit (see “Point–C...Discussion of this post at ZenPundit (see “Point–Counterpoint on Mexico,” beginning March 31) led to the following exchange:<br /><br />Mark Safranski: <br /><br />Frankly, we are all better off if Ronfeldt is correct and the “alarmists” are wrong, though I think the grim state of affairs south of the Rio Grande is deterring most Mexico experts from going out on a limb to make positive predictions.<br /><br />My comment: <br /><br />The little feedback I’ve received on my posting indicates the following: Yes, camarillas are still important, esp for PRI leaders, but camarilla dynamics are now more about garnering contacts than striving for power. And yes, there’s increasing awareness among American officials operating along the border that more/better networks are needed with Mexicans, but there is also immense inertia and distrust impeding their organization, informally and formally. So, I too remain pessimistic, but still reluctant to turn alarmist, given my past experiences, as well as my continuing sense that my post’s points remain on a likely track.<br /><br />Meanwhile, what I’ve most wondered these past few days is the extent to which all the new U.S. border-line (borderline?) security measures (esp the fence) are "causing" much of the upsurge in violence by and competition among the different types of criminal gangs in Mexico, and also against the government, perhaps in part because of how those measures re-channel access routes. Surely this proposition has already been noted and discussed somewhere(s), and I just haven’t read enough yet. If the proposition is valid, it could have quite a mix of implications, positive and negative.<br /><br />Mark Safranski:<br /><br />The PRI era camarillas as you described them reminded me of the old, Soviet, nomenklatura "clans" - except that the Mexican camarillas seem to have stayed relatively benign while the Russian nomenklatura fractured into siloviki, mafiyas and oligarch factions and have been anything but positive in their influence.<br /><br />Border security, unless it is comprehensive and systemic, might be like squeezing a balloon as you suggest. We’re raising transaction costs but ultimately drug smugglers could put their drug product on a plane or boat to a third country and just raise the price by the marginal difference. Coyotes can head deeper into the desert - the border is long and the ppl manning it are relatively few relative to it’s size. Unless underlying structural issues ( drug laws, temporary labor access) are addressed, tweaking gun control laws, adding "smart" fences etc. just nibbles at the edges.David Ronfeldthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06488855410947866567noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4245279442880338057.post-61648280660198909742009-03-31T09:25:00.000-07:002009-03-31T09:25:00.000-07:00To get a feel for Mexican culture, I have found th...To get a feel for Mexican culture, I have found the novels of Paco Ignacio Taibo II an enjoyable passage south. Oddly, the acclaimed crime writer once co-authored a book in collaboration with Subcommandante Marcos.Jay Taberhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11016367021003977811noreply@blogger.com